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Leverage Is Everything: 
Understanding the Trump 
Administration’s Linkage between 
Trade Agreements and 
Unilateral Import Restrictions 
Richard O. Cunningham* 
This paper offers an understanding of the Trump 
administration’s (Administration) often-perplexing approach to 
international trade policy and, in particular, the 
Administration’s repeated threats to withdraw from or 
renegotiate bilateral, regional and multilateral trade agreements. 
The central premise offered here is that all Administration trade 
actions—including both its approach to trade agreements and its 
threats or use of unilateral import restrictions—must be seen in 
terms of two fundamental goals. The first is to eliminate U.S. 
trade deficits with foreign countries (individually or collectively). 
The second is to restore the U.S. manufacturing sector by 
limiting imports and by bringing back to the U.S. manufacturing 
that had been moved to other countries. Renegotiation of trade 
agreements and imposition of import restrictions are closely 
integrated tactics used to accomplish these goals. Thus, neither 
should be seen as an end in itself, but rather as leverage toward 
achieving whatever specific goal the Administration seeks at the 
time. In one situation, import restrictions (or threat thereof) 
may serve as leverage in a trade agreement negotiation. In 
another situation, a trade negotiation may be conducted in a 
manner that provides leverage to obtain a limitation of imports. 
In analyzing this approach to trade, this paper addresses the 
following: A brief summary of the Trump Administration’s trade 
policy and objectives; specific examples of the Administration’s 
leverage-based strategy in action; and more detailed discussions 
of the Administration’s leverage strategies in the three most 
important areas of U.S. trade today: US-China trade, the effort 
either to change or withdraw from the World Trade 
Organization, and the attempt to reshape the structure of North 
America by renegotiating or withdrawing from the North 
American Free Trade Agreement. 
 
* Senior International Trade Partner at Steptoe & Johnson LLP. This paper 
is an adaption of a presentation made at the Frederick K. Cox International 
Law Center Conference on “International Law & Policy in the Age of 
Trump” Cleveland, Ohio on September 14, 2018. 
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I.  The Trade Objectives and Strategies of the 
Trump Administration 
Donald J. Trump was elected President of the United States, 
largely because of an angry feeling on the part of a substantial 
segment of the American electorate that the globalization of the U.S. 
economy has enriched sophisticated, cosmopolitan East and West 
Coast Americans while leaving them behind.1 The Trump campaign 
relentlessly complained that “bad trade agreements”2 have permitted 
rising volumes of imports and have facilitated the movement of U.S. 
manufacturing operations offshore—thus depriving U.S. workers of 
good jobs in the manufacturing sector.3 
It is important to note that this argument did not target, nor did 
it appeal to, a majority of Americans.  Remember that Hillary 
Clinton received nearly three million more votes than Donald Trump.4  
But it struck a chord of resentment in a swath of industrial states 
that had historically voted Democratic or are “swing states:” 
Pennsylvania, West Virginia, Ohio, Michigan, Wisconsin—all of 
 
1. See Robert Leonard, Opinion, Why Rural America Voted for Trump, N.Y. 
TIMES (Jan. 5, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/05/opinion/why-
rural-america-voted-for-trump.html [https://perma.cc/9EV6-GERT] 
(discussing the dynamics that led certain Americans to vote for Trump). 
2. MARCUS NOLAND ET. AL., PETERSON INST. FOR INT’L ECON., ASSESSING 
TRADE AGENDAS IN THE US PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN 23 (2016). 
3. Donald J. Trump, United States 2016 Presidential Election Candidate, 
Speech at Alumisource in Monessen, Pennsylvania (June 28, 2016).   
4. Sarah Begley, Hillary Clinton Leads by 2.8 Million in Final Popular Vote 
Count, TIME (Dec. 20, 2016), http://time.com/4608555/hillary-clinton-
popular-vote-final/ [https://perma.cc/5PB6-XE24]. 
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which swung for Trump and gave him victory in the electoral college.5  
This is the “base” that the President sees (correctly) as the key to 
continuation in power of his party, which is now the Trump Party 
more than a traditional Republican Party.6  And he sees maintaining 
the allegiance of the base as being dependent on his Administration 
making good on the trade promises he made during the campaign. 
The Trump Administration therefore has little use for trade 
agreements or policies that enhance a rules-based trading system7 or 
that facilitate the development or maintenance of efficient “value 
chains” which diversify the international sourcing of production 
inputs.8  This view permeates almost every aspect of the 
Administration’s thinking about trade-related issues.  For example, 
the Administration is hostile to investor-state dispute settlement 
provisions in trade agreements9--not out of concern about the possible 
liability of governments, but based on the view that providing a 
remedy against unfair actions by host governments would make it 
safer for U.S. companies to establish production abroad.10 
Candidate Trump, in keeping with this view of trade, condemned 
the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)11 and President Trump 
 
5. Todd Spangler, The Rust Belt Gave Trump Victory, Now They Want Jobs 
in Return, USA Tᴏᴅᴀʏ (Jan. 18, 2017), https://www.usatoday.com 
/story/news/politics/2017/01/18/rust-belt-voters-donald-trump/96670922/ 
[https://perma.cc/JE9H-58AR]. 
6. Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Two Years and Hundreds of Inflammatory Ads Later, 
the G.O.P. is the Party of Trump, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 6, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/06/us/politics/republicans-midterms-
trump-racial-division.html [https://perma.cc/JE8A-X422]. 
7. WAYNE M. MORRISON & ANDRES B. SCHWARZENBERG, CONG. RESEARCH 
SERV., IF11035, MANAGED TRADE AND QUANTITATIVE RESTRICTIONS: ISSUES 
FOR CONGRESS (2018). 
8. Id.; see also WTO ᴇᴛ ᴀʟ., GLOBAL VALUE CHAINS IN A CHANGING WORLD 
(Deborah K. Elms & Patrick Low eds., 2013), https://www.wto.org 
/english/res_e/booksp_e/aid4tradeglobalvalue13_e.pdf (discussing the 
global value chains and the way they shape the international economy). 
9. James McBride, How Are Trade Disputes Resolved?, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN 
REL. (Oct. 25, 2018), https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/how-are-trade-
disputes-resolved [https://perma.cc/2VCW-P4Y3]. 
10. See id. (discussing the Trump Administration’s concern with non-
Americans have control over U.S. law with counterarguments that the 
current system of investor-trade agreements protects U.S. foreign 
investments). 
11. Cristiano Lima, Trump Calls Trade Deal ‘a rape of our country,’ POLITICO 
(June 28, 2016, 9:12 PM), https://www.politico.com/story/2016/06/donald-
trump-trans-pacific-partnership-224916 [https://perma.cc/R7LE-UD4E]. 
Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 51 (2019) 
Leverage is Everything 
52 
withdrew from it.12  For similar reasons, his Administration essentially 
discontinued negotiations with the European Union for a 
Transatlantic Trade & Investment Partnership (TTIP).13  He 
condemned The WTO as hostile to American interests, and has 
recently threatened to “pull the United States out” if the WTO “does 
not shape up.”14 He also characterized the North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) as “the worst trade deal ever,” and the 
Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (KORUS) as “a horrible deal,” and 
pledged to either renegotiate or withdraw from them.15 
The Administration has also initiated a series of proceedings 
aimed at severely restricting imports of industrial products.16  So-
called “national security” investigations have been initiated under 
Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 196217 against imports of 
steel, aluminum, uranium and autos (including auto parts), and a 
further proceeding has been threatened against semiconductor 
imports.18  In addition, a proceeding under Section 301 of the U.S. 
Trade Act of 197419 against Chinese technology-related practices has 
 
12. Trump Executive Order Pulls Out of TTP Trade Deal, BBC NEWS (Jan. 24, 
2017), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-38721056 [https:// 
perma.cc/B6SL-SGG2]. 
13. Philip Blenkinsop, U.S. Trade Talks in Deep Freeze After Trump Win, 
Says EU, REUTERS (Nov. 11, 2016), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-
usa-election-eu-trade-idUSKBN1361UN [https://perma.cc/23JF-3TJB]. 
14. John Micklethwait et al., Trump Threatens to Pull U.S. Out of WTO If It 
Doesn’t ‘Shape Up’, Bʟᴏᴏᴍʙᴇʀɢ (Aug. 30, 2018), https://www.bloomberg 
.com/news/articles/2018-08-30/trump-says-he-will-pull-u-s-out-of-wto-if-
they-don-t-shape-up [https://perma.cc/Z4HF-TL8L]. 
15. Michael Collins, What is NAFTA? Seven Things to Know About the North 
American Free Trade Pact, USA TODAY (last updated Aug. 23, 2018, 11:13 
AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2018/08/23/nafta-
seven-things-you-should-know-free-trade-agreement/1063956002/ 
[https://perma.cc/B7AT-XB7W]; Philip Rucker, Trump: ‘We May 
Terminate’ U.S.-South Korea Trade Agreement, WASH. POST (Apr. 28, 
2017), https://www. washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-we-may-terminate-
us-south-korea-trade-agreement/2017/04/27/75ad1218-2bad-11e7-a616-
d7c8a68c1a66_story.html [https://perma.cc/ATR4-DVTH]. 
16. See Trump Directs Commerce to Open Section 232 Investigation of Auto 
Imports, Cᴏᴠɪɴɢᴛᴏɴ & Bᴜʀʟɪɴɢ LLP (May 24, 2018), 
https://www.cov.com//media/files/corporate/publications/2018/05/trump
_directs_commerce_to_open_section_232_investigation_of_auto_import
s.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZS9V-UVF2] (discussing the restrictions on steel 
and aluminum imports). 
17. 19 U.S.C. §1862. 
18. COVINGTON, supra note 16. 
19. 19 U.S.C. §2411.  
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resulted in tariffs on $50 billion of Chinese imports, with a specific 
threat of tariffs on an additional $200 billion of Chinese imports.20 
It is important to understand two reasons why the Trump 
Administration has turned to Sections 232 and 301 as the principal 
vehicles for limiting imports.  First, unlike such traditional “trade 
remedy” laws as the antidumping and countervailing duty statutes21, 
Sections 232 and 301 give the President essentially unlimited 
flexibility to devise whatever forms and levels of import restriction he 
deems appropriate.22  Thus, these remedies can be adapted to achieve 
whatever form and degree of leverage the Administration deems 
necessary. 
Second, and perhaps more important, impositions of import 
restrictions under these laws are discretionary Presidential decisions 
that are not appealable to the U.S. courts.23 Moreover, as to Section 
232, it is this Administration’s firm (but quite likely erroneous) view 
that a decision to restrict imports cannot be challenged in a WTO 
dispute settlement proceeding.24 
It would, in the opinion of this writer, be a mistake to view the 
use of these two statutes by the Trump Administration purely in 
terms of the stated purposes of those laws – namely the protection of 
U.S. national security (Section 232) and removal or amelioration of a 
foreign government’s unjustifiable or unreasonable trade practices 
(Section 301).  Rather, as the case-specific discussions in this paper 
will make clear, President Trump sees these proceedings as creating 
flexible threats of import restrictions that can be used as powerful 
leverage to put pressure on governments to make concessions in trade 
negotiations or to change trade (or other) policies in ways demanded 
by the United States. 
It is often observed that Donald Trump is a “transactional” 
president.25  Nowhere is that more evident than in his approach to 
 
20. Press Release, Statement by U.S. Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer 
on Section 301 Action (July 10, 2018), https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-
offices/press-office/press-releases/2018/august/statement-us-trade-
representative [https://perma.cc/L8CR-5XU3]. 
21. Trade Remedy Laws, U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, https://www.usitc.gov/ 
trade_remedy_laws.htm [https:// perma.cc/HT9H-ASKC]. 
22. MARCUS NOLAND ET. AL., supra note 2, at 9-11. 
23. Trade Expansion Act of 1962 §232, 19 U.S.C. §1862 (1964); Cᴏɴɢ. 
Rᴇsᴇᴀʀᴄʜ Sᴇʀᴠ., R45249, Sᴇᴄᴛɪᴏɴ 232 INVESTIGATIONS: OVERVIEW AND 
ISSUES FOR CONGRESS (2018). 
24. Panels Established to Review US Steel and Aluminum Tariffs, 
Countermeasures on US Imports, Wᴏʀʟᴅ Tʀᴀᴅᴇ Oʀɢᴀɴɪᴢᴀᴛɪᴏɴ (Nov. 
21, 2018), https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news18_e/dsb_19nov18 
_e.htm [https://perma.cc/GX5J-6N5C]. 
25. See, e.g., Robert Costa, Conservatives Now Wonder if Transactional Trump 
Might Leave Them in the Cold, WASH. POST (Nov. 6, 2018), 
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international trade.  Issues are to be resolved and goals to be achieved 
by negotiating a “deal,”26  he is much less comfortable in negotiating 
about rules than he is about negotiating amounts and dollar values, 
as he has done in his long career in real estate.27    
In trade agreement negotiations, as well as in enforcement of U.S. 
trade laws, President Trump’s strong inclination is to put primary 
emphasis on reducing imports into the U.S., rather than reducing or 
eliminating foreign barriers to U.S exports.28  At bottom, his critique 
of U.S. trade agreements is that they have opened up U.S. markets to 
imports.29  He quotes George Washington and Abraham Lincoln to 
the effect that it is important to protect U.S. industries from import 
competition.30 
Underlying President Trump’s trade philosophy is a conviction 
that other countries have been “unfair” in trade.31  In part, this 
represents such traditional trade concerns as subsidies, dumping, theft 
or forced transfer of U.S. firms’ intellectual property, state 
control/guidance of producing enterprises and the like.32  But his  
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/conservatives-now-wonder-if-
transactional-trump-might-leave-them-in-the-cold/2018/11/06/09e399c2-
e118-11e8-ab2c-b31dcd53ca6b_story.html?utm_term =.ddfd8937c77d 
[https://perma.cc/S3KL-G3AA] (referring to  President Trump as 
“transactional Trump”). 
26. See Philip Rucker & Josh Dawsey, Trump Two Years In: The Dealmaker 
Who Can’t Seem to Make a Deal, WASH. POST (Jan. 20, 2019), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-two-years-in-the-
dealmaker-who-cant-seem-to-make-a-deal/2019/01/20/ecdede96-1bf9-11e9-
88fe-f9f77a3bcb6c_story.html?utm_term =.edd3cbd63b37 [https:// 
perma.cc/Y9NM-QU4X] (describing President Trump as a “dealmaker”). 
27. See, e.g., David Nakamura & Seung Min Kim, ‘He’s a Gut Politician’: 
Trump’s Go-To Negotiating Tactics Aren’t Working in Shutdown Standoff, 
WASH. POST (Jan. 9, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/hes-
a-gut-politician-trumps-go-to-negotiating-tactics-not-working-in-shutdown-
standoff/2019/01/09/c7bb5ff2-142b-11e9-b6ad-
9cfd62dbb0a8_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.834e695a59cd 
[https://perma.cc/SBU2-SDEJ] (describing President Trump’s negotiating 
techniques). 
28. Id. 
29. Binyamin Appelbaum, On Trade, Donald Trump Breaks With 200 Years of 
Economic Orthodoxy, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 10, 2016), https://www.nytimes 
.com/2016/03/11/us/politics/-trade-donald-trump-breaks-200-years-
economic-orthodoxy-mercantilism.html [https://perma.cc/AY7V-C6HH]. 
30. Donald J. Trump, 2016 Presidential Candidate, Remarks in New York City: 
States of the Election (June 22, 2016). 
31. President Donald J. Trump is Confronting China’s Unfair Trade Policies, 
THE WHITE HOUSE (May 29, 2018), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-
statements/president-donald-j-trump-confronting-chinas-unfair-trade-
policies/ [https://perma.cc/23ML-CYGD]. 
32. Id. 
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definition of “unfairness” also extends to low wage rates and even to 
foreign consumers’ preference for German, Japanese or Korean 
automobiles over U.S. cars.33 
One is tempted to conclude that, except as to the 
Administration’s efforts to force structural changes in China’s “state 
capitalism” (discussed later in this paper), the allegations of 
“unfairness” are largely rhetorical and tactical.  In most contexts, the 
U.S. is not seeking “fairness” for its own sake, but rather alleges 
“unfairness” as a justification for the threats of import restrictions 
that it uses as leverage to achieve the goals of eliminating bilateral 
trade deficits and bringing manufacturing – and jobs – back to the 
United States. 
Much of President Trump’s approach to trade issues, and 
particularly to trade negotiations, is shared by his U.S. Trade 
Representative (USTR), Robert Lighthizer.  For over a quarter 
century, Bob Lighthizer was the lead counsel in antidumping, 
countervailing duty, and safeguard cases brought by the American 
steel industry.34  He shares the views that foreign governments 
andtheir exporters behave unfairly, that high tariffs are appropriate to 
respond to that unfairness and, most importantly for the discussion 
herein, that negotiations will not effectively address trade problems 
without the leverage provided by the threat that such high tariffs will 
be imposed if the foreign party does not agree to U.S. demands.35  As 
Deputy USTR in the Reagan Administration, he negotiated 
comprehensive “voluntary” restraint agreements (VRAs) with foreign 
governments by threatening the imposition of high tariffs if they did 
not agree to quantitative limitations.36 
With these considerations in mind, I turn now to discussions of 
how this Administration’s leverage-based trade policy has been 
applied in specific negotiations. 
 
33. See, e.g., Charles Riley, Made in America: The German Cars Trump 
Doesn’t Want, CNN (June 12, 2018), 
https://money.cnn.com/2018/06/11/news/economy/german-cars-trump-
trade/index.html [https://perma.cc/U7TS-9ZJV] (describing President 
Trump’s statements about foreign consumers’ preference for German cars). 
34. Ana Swanson, The Little-Known Trade Adviser Who Wields Enormous 
Power in Washington, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 9, 2018), https://www. 
nytimes.com/2018/03/09/us/politics/robert-lighthizer-trade.html 
[https://perma.cc/9HWN-PZ7P]. 
35. THE WHITE HOUSE supra note 31. 
36. John Burton, Trump Rolls the Dice on China Trade, ASIA TIMESꜱ(Mar. 23, 
2018), http://www.atimes.com/article/trump-rolls-dice-china-trade/ [https: 
//perma.cc/W27S-Z5LQ]. 
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II.  The Use of “National Security” Import 
Restrictions as Leverage 
Section 232, the “National Security Amendment,” authorizes the 
President, pursuant to an investigation and recommendation by the 
Department of Commerce, to “adjust” imports and/or to take other 
steps where imports of a product threaten to impair the national 
security of the United States.37 The statute enumerates two 
alternative bases on which such a threat to national security may be 
found: 
•The product in question is essential to national security and 
imports threaten the availability of sufficient supply of that 
product to meet national security needs, or 
•Imports of the product threaten a domestic industry 
sufficiently to endanger the economic welfare of the country.38 
Until the Trump Administration, all Section 232 determinations 
have turned on the first of these two criteria—namely, whether 
imports threaten adequate supply to meet national security needs 
(considered to mean defense needs).39  Applying that standard, import 
restrictions were ordered in only four cases.40  Three were petroleum 
cases generally regarded as sui generis,41 and the fourth was a 
machine tool case in which the major exporting country agreed to 
voluntary export restraints.42  In all other cases, including a steel 
sector case in 2001, it was determined that, despite increasing imports 
and injury caused to U.S. producers by those imports, there was no 
threat to the adequacy of supply available to meet U.S. defense 
requirements.43  In several cases, supply was found to be adequate on 
the basis of availability from “safe and reliable” foreign countries even 
if U.S. producers might not be able to supply adequate quantities.44  
 
37. Trade Expansion Act of 1962 §232, 19 U.S.C. §1862 (1964). 
38. Id. 
39. See CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R45249, SECTION 232 INVESTIGATIONS: 
OVERVIEW AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 3–4 (2018) (describing the Section 232 
investigations to date). 
40. Id. at 3. 
41. Id. 
42. Id. at 4. 
43. Id. 
44. See McLARTY UPDATE: Section 232 Aluminum/Steel Investigation 
Department of Commerce (DOC) Report Released, MCLARTY ASSOCIATES 
(Feb. 16, 2018), https://maglobal.com/mclarty-update-section-232-
aluminum-steel-investigation-department-commerce-doc-report-released/ 
[https://perma.cc/GP2A-BAFC] (describing the exclusion of “safe” foreign 
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And in the 2001 Section 232 steel case—the last case before the 
Trump Administration—Commerce stated explicitly that the issue of 
whether imports threatened the health of the domestic industry was 
“beyond the scope” of the Department’s inquiry.45 
The Trump Administration, only a few months after taking office, 
launched Section 232 proceedings on steel and aluminum imports.46  
Neither industry had petitioned for or even considered Section 232 
relief.47  The steel producers and their workers had supported Mr. 
Trump in the election48 and, in so doing, had advocated a global 
limitation on steel imports. However, on the day they were summoned 
to the White House, they expected to be told that a safeguard 
proceeding would be initiated under Section 201.49  To their great 
surprise, they were told that Section 232 proceedings would be 
initiated concerning imports of steel and aluminum.50 
After conducting investigations sufficient in its view to satisfy the 
vague procedural requirements of Section 232, the Department of 
Commerce found, as to both steel and aluminum, that imports 
threatened to impair the security of the United States.51  The 
Department then recommended that the President impose substantial 
tariffs to “adjust” imports sufficiently to permit both U.S. industries 
to increase their levels of capacity utilization—in the case of steel, to 
 
countries from section 232 investigations); Andy Home, RPT-COLUMN-
Which Sledgehammer Will Trump Use on U.S. Aluminium Imports?, 
REUTERS (Feb. 20, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/usa-trade-steel-
aluminium-ahome/rpt-column-which-sledgehammer-will-trump-use-on-us-
aluminium-imports-andy-home-idUSL8N1QA5NF [perma.cc/VS6N-BNJL] 
(describing the exclusion of “reliable supplier” foreign nations from section 
232 investigations). 
45. The Effect of Imports of Iron Ore and Semi-Finished Steel On the National 
Security, U.S. Dᴇᴘᴀʀᴛᴍᴇɴᴛ ᴏfꜱ Cᴏᴍᴍᴇʀᴄᴇ Bᴜʀᴇᴀᴜ ᴏfꜱ Exᴘᴏʀᴛ 
Aᴅᴍɪɴɪsᴛʀᴀᴛɪᴏɴ 37 (2001). 
46. CONG. RESEARCH SERV., supra note 39, at 5. 
47. Id. 
48. See Nick Carey, Trump Steel Tariffs May Leave These U.S. Steelworkers 
Jobless, REUTERS (Mar. 9, 2018, 4:55 PM), https://www.reuters.com 
/article/us-usa-trade-steel-jobs/trump-steel-tariffs-may-leave-these-u-s-
steelworkers-jobless-idUSKCN1GL2V9 [https://perma.cc/8H85-UXEL] 
(describing the impact on President Trump’s steel tariffs). 
49. See Chad Brown, Trump’s Long-awaited Steel and Aluminum Tariffs Are 
Just the Beginning, PIIE (Mar. 26, 2018, 12:00 PM), https://piie.com 
/blogs/trade-investment-policy-watch/trumps-long-awaited-steel-and-
aluminum-tariffs-are-just [https://perma.cc/M8UR-D4B7] (indicating that 
the tariffs were not what the steelworkers who voted for Trump were 
expecting). 
50. CONG. RESEARCH SERV., supra note 39, at 5. 
51. Id. at 6. 
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80 percent.52 In making these determinations, Commerce ignored past 
Section 232 precedent and did not consider whether imports 
threatened the adequacy of supply available for defense needs.53  Such 
a standard would clearly not have justified an affirmative 
determination, since only small percentages of U.S. steel and 
aluminum production (three percent in the case of steel) are used for 
defense purposes.54 Instead, Commerce determined that imports 
jeopardized the health of the domestic industry and thus, threatened 
U.S. economic welfare.55  One might question that conclusion, at least 
as to the steel industry, which was enjoying strong operating results 
and had subjected the majority of imports to antidumping and 
countervailing duty orders.56  But of course, these determinations 
were not appealable.57 
President Trump ordered that imports be “adjusted” by 
imposition of twenty-five percent tariffs on steel (slightly higher than 
Commerce had recommended) and ten percent on aluminum.58  As to 
certain countries (including Canada, Mexico, Korea, Brazil, 
Argentina, Australia and the European Union), however, the 
President suspended imposition of those tariffs to permit those 
countries to negotiate alternative means of removing the threat to 
U.S. national security.59 This was done for the stated reason that 
those countries are security allies of the United States.60 
Based on the foregoing, one may certainly conclude that these 
cases had little to do with either national security or, at least in the 
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case of steel, with serious threat to the viability of the U.S. industry.  
While the “adjustment” of imports definitely benefited both domestic 
industries, largely in the form of increased market prices,61 it is also 
clear that the Trump Administration used the Section 232 tariffs in 
its trade negotiations with several nations. 
A. Canada and Mexico 
The steel and aluminum tariffs—along with the subsequent threat 
of Section 232 tariffs on autos and auto parts—became a significant 
bargaining tool in the renegotiation of NAFTA.62  This is discussed in 
Section V of this paper. 
B. The European Union 
The EU strongly protested the steel and aluminum tariffs,63 
challenged them in the WTO,64 implemented retaliatory tariffs65 
(justified by the interesting argument that the tariffs were in fact not 
national security measures, but were instead safeguard measures, 
which give rise to a claim for compensation under WTO rates), and 
initially insisted that it would not negotiate until and unless the EU 
were permanently and unconditionally exempted from any Section 232 
steel and aluminum measures.66  But this position changed when the 
Trump Administration initiated a Section 232 proceeding on autos 
and auto parts, implicating a much larger volume of trade and posing 
a far larger economic threat to EU Member States, especially 
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Germany.67  At that point, an EU delegation hurried to Washington, 
offering increased purchases of U.S. products and a free trade 
negotiation covering most trade in goods, regulatory cooperation, and 
some services trade issues.68 The U.S. agreed to enter the trade 
negotiation and to refrain from any new tariffs on imports from the 
EU (i.e., deferral of Section 232 auto tariffs) pending the trade 
negotiation.69 But the steel and aluminum tariffs remain in effect.70  
This means that, despite its repeated statements that it would not 
negotiate “with a gun to its head,”71 the EU is now negotiating with a 
United States that enjoys two major forms of tariff-based leverage—
the ability to lift the steel and aluminum tariffs in response to EU 
negotiating concessions and the threat of imposing auto tariffs if the 
EU does not agree to U.S. negotiating demands. 
C.  South Korea 
Here the U.S. used concessions to Korea in trade negotiations to 
achieve an agreement on steel and aluminum tariffs that the U.S. 
badly needed as a precedent for its Section 232 exemption 
negotiations with other nations.72 As noted earlier, Candidate Trump 
repeatedly derided the KORUS FTA as one of the worst trade deals 
ever negotiated.73  Accordingly, one of the first tasks assigned to new 
USTR Lighthizer was to renegotiate KORUS to eliminate the U.S. 
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trade deficit to Korea.74 Negotiations were commenced, which became 
a major political problem for the South Korean government at a time 
when it was important for the two countries to avoid conflicts that 
could interfere with their united effort to negotiate with North 
Korea.75  And Ambassador Lighthizer quickly became convinced that 
no KORUS renegotiation could significantly improve the trade deficit 
unless it included Korean concessions in areas—such as rice trade—
that both sides understood were non-negotiable.76  Yet the President 
and Administration protectionists were threatening to walk away 
from KORUS if they could not announce some sort of success in the 
FTA renegotiation.77 
The solution to Ambassador Lighthizer’s problem took the form 
of a deal to conclude the KORUS renegotiation with essentially 
cosmetic agreement changes in return for Korea agreeing to something 
the U.S. badly needed in connection with the Section 232 steel and 
aluminum measures.78 When the U.S. invited countries to seek 
exemption for the Section 232 tariffs, it conditioned the granting of 
such exemptions on a country’s agreement to implement alternative 
measures that would remove the threat posed to U.S. security by 
imports from that country.79 USTR needed to make it clear that such 
an “alternative measure” would have to include a sharp reduction in 
that country’s volume of steel and aluminum exports to the United 
States.  And for that reason, USTR offered to conclude the KORUS 
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renegotiation with two auto-related changes (that sounded good but 
were entirely cosmetic)80 if Korea would agree, as a condition of 
exempting its steel exports from the Section 232 tariffs, to reduce the 
volume of its steel exports to an annual level 30 percent below the 
2015-17 average.81  
Korea agreed to that deal,82 which shows that leverage can work 
in both directions when unilateral import restrictions are imposed or 
threatened in parallel with trade negotiations.  Here, it was the 
Korean political imperative to bring the KORUS renegotiation to an 
end that provided the leverage needed by the U.S. on a major issue 
relating to the Section 232 tariffs. 
D.  Turkey 
It is important to understand that the leverage provided by 
unilateral import restrictions can be used as leverage for disputes that 
have nothing to do with trade, provided the Administration has the 
flexibility to increase or reduce the import restrictions at will. The 
Trump Administration’s use of the Section 232 steel and aluminum 
tariffs for leverage in a non-trade issue with Turkey demonstrates how 
tariffs can become an all-purpose leverage device. 
Turkey is a substantial exporter of steel to the United States.83  
Initially, its exports suffered as a result of the steel tariffs.84  However, 
as U.S. steel market price levels rose, the effect of the tariffs became 
less onerous on all foreign exporters, including the Turkish 
producers.85 This is what happens in a commodity market when the 
same tariff is imposed on imports from all sources.86 
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This summer, however, a dispute arose over the Turkish 
Government’s prosecution and imprisonment of an American pastor.87  
President Trump demanded that the pastor be released.88 When the 
Turkish government refused, President Trump ordered that the 
Section 232 steel and aluminum tariffs on imports from Turkey be 
doubled, to fifty percent and twenty percent respectively.89  In 
contrast to the effect of a tariff applied equally to imports from all 
sources, where increase in the market price can reduce or eliminate 
the burden on exporters, a tariff applied only to imports from one 
country hits that country’s exporters with full impact.90 
Not surprisingly, the Turkish Government released the American 
pastor after the U.S. employed the Section 232 tariffs as 
leverage.  Successful or not, however, this case shows that the Trump 
Administration regards these tariffs as potentially all-purpose leverage 
devices, not just means of ensuring national security or protecting a 
domestic industry. 
III.  Section 301 Tariffs and the US-China Trade 
Conflict 
Arguably the most important issue in international trade today is 
how China’s “state capitalism” system can be reconciled with the 
rules-based WTO system.91  The USTR has conducted an 
investigation pursuant to Section 301 and has determined that China 
has acted unfairly in numerous respects.92  These include theft and 
forced transfers of U.S. companies’ intellectual property, extensive 
subsidies, and restrictions on foreign firms’ ability to do business in 
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China.93 Pursuant to these findings, the United States has already 
imposed tariffs on $50 billion of imports from China (in two 
tranches)94 and China has retaliated by imposing tariffs on an 
equivalent volume of imports from the United States.95  This is in 
addition to China-U.S. tariffs and retaliatory tariffs earlier in the 
year, growing out of the Section 232 investigations of steel and 
aluminum.96 
This tariff conflict is occurring alongside efforts by both countries 
to reach a negotiated resolution.97  China has proposed on several 
occasions a “resolution” in which China would reduce the bilateral 
trade deficit by making quite large increases in its importation of U.S. 
goods, notably natural gas and agricultural products.98  In June, 
Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross agreed in principle to such a deal,99 
but it was opposed by senior Administration officials—led by USTR 
Lighthizer and Trade & Industrial Policy Advisor Peter Navarro—
and the Chinese proposal was ultimately rejected.100  Those U.S. 
officials, backed so far by President Trump, insist that any resolution 
must focus on commitments by China to modify a broad range of 
policies and practices that the United States considers not only unfair, 
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but seriously disruptive of trade and injurious to the U.S. economy, 
including: 
•requiring, as a condition of establishing operations in China, 
that a foreign company enter a joint venture with a Chinese 
competitor and transfer proprietary technology to that joint 
venture; 
•theft, by “hacking” and otherwise, of U.S. firms’ intellectual 
property; 
•maintaining market-disrupting overcapacity in steel and 
aluminum, with overcapacity in semiconductors scheduled to 
come on-stream soon; 
•control by state-owned enterprises of China’s industrial assets, 
together with state ownership or control of some of the world’s 
largest banks; 
•the “Made in China 2025” project, in which massive subsidies 
will be provided for the development (including technology 
development) of selected industries including semiconductors, 
aircraft, new energy vehicles and biotech; and 
•control of data flows by requiring storage of data in China and 
by forbidding foreign companies to set up their own data 
centers in China.101 
China has largely refused to negotiate on these issues, denying 
some of the allegations and taking the position as to others that, since 
China insists that it is still a developing country, that this status 
permits China to engage in these practices.102 
After failure in August of the latest set of China negotiations, 
President Trump announced the intention to apply tariffs to an 
additional $200 billion in Chinese imports.103  And he has intimated 
that he would consider tariffs on an additional $267 billion in 
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imports.104  That would place tariffs on essentially all of China’s 
exports to the United States.105 
This accelerating trade war takes the Trump Administration’s 
leverage strategy to what could be its ultimate test.  China shows no 
sign of abandoning or ameliorating policies that it sees as essential to 
its rightful economic development. Moreover, the use of tariffs to 
enforce Section 301 determination is flatly WTO-inconsistent.106  The 
USTR argument—that most of these Chinese practices are not 
specifically covered by WTO disciplines and “therefore” unilateral 
tariffs are a permissible remedy107—does not, in the view of this 
writer, pass the “laugh test.”  The point is that the U.S. is imposing 
tariffs in excess of its WTO-bound limits, without any WTO 
authority for so doing.108 
This is, of course, a difficult issue.  There is validity in the U.S. 
concerns that China’s practices are disruptive of trade and injurious 
to the United States, and that these practices are fundamentally 
inconsistent with the rules-based trading system.  But it is also true 
that the U.S. response is WTO-inconsistent.  This is the 
quintessential example of a dispute that should be settled by 
negotiation.  But there seems to be no willingness on China’s part to 
engage on these “structural” issues109 and that is why the United 
States seems intent on continuing to ratchet up the leverage. 
IV. U.S. Desire to Renegotiate the WTO Agreement 
The World Trade Organization, the central authority in the rules-
based trading system, was in large part the creation of U.S. trade 
policy.110  In particular, it was the United States that orchestrated (in 
the Uruguay Round) the creation of a Dispute Settlement Mechanism 
(DSM) that would apply the general language of the WTO 
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Agreements to specific disputes and whose rulings could not be vetoed 
by the losing WTO Member.111 
Today, the Trump Administration—both U.S. Trade 
Representative Lighthizer and the President himself—questions 
whether the WTO serves America’s interests,112 objects in particular 
to the DSM,113 and has gone so far as to threaten U.S. withdrawal 
from the WTO.114 The Administration’s concerns focus primarily on 
what it perceives as three fundamental problem areas: 
1.The difficulty in applying WTO rules to China’s “strategic 
capitalism”115 (or, as USTR describes it in the President’s 2018 
Trade Policy Agenda, “the extensive distortions in China’s 
economy”).116 
2.The divide that has progressively widened between the 
developed countries that originally founded the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and developing 
countries—now the great majority of WTO Members—who see 
trade liberalization as secondary to those countries’ policies to 
promote their economic development.117  This split has been 
largely responsible for repeated stalemates in multilateral and 
plurilateral trade negotiations.118  And it raises serious and 
difficult questions when some developing countries—China, 
India and Brazil come to mind—evolve into major trading 
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nations yet continue to claim the “special and differential 
treatment” accorded by WTO rules to developing countries.119 
The extent to which the DSM, in interpreting how the general 
rules set forth in the antidumping, countervailing duty, and 
safeguard agreements should be applied to specific facts, has 
frequently found U.S. trade remedy practices to be WTO-
inconsistent (although the United States has won the vast 
majority of WTO challenges it has brought against other 
countries’ practices).120 
The Administration has embarked on a serious “commit[ment] to 
reform[] the global trading system in ways that lead to fairer 
outcomes for U.S. workers and businesses…”121 and to “press for 
significant reform of the WTO.”122 While all of the foregoing concerns 
are implicated in that effort, a specific focus, and the one as to which 
the Administration is employing the leverage tactics discussed in this 
paper, is a multi-faceted “reform” of the Dispute Settlement 
Understanding.  The U.S. contends that: 
•The application of Agreement rules to specific facts in ways 
that the U.S. believes do not “adhere[] strictly to the text of 
those agreements, as negotiated and agreed by its Members.”123  
The 2018 Trade Policy Agenda complains that “Concerns 
abound that dispute reports have added to or diminished rights 
or obligations in varied areas, such as subsidies, antidumping 
duties, and countervailing duties….”124  
•The rendering of “as such” rulings, which find that a country’s 
on-going rule or practice, not just the outcome of a particular 
 
119. US Wants WTO to Define ‘Developing Country’, Alleges Major Economies 
Self-define as Such to Avail Concessions, FIRSTPOST (Mar. 2, 2018), 
https://www.firstpost.com/world/us-wants-wto-to-define-developing-
country-alleges-major-economies-self-define-as-such-to-avail-concessions-
4373155.html [https://perma.cc/KV9K-MRFS]. 
120. See, e.g., Duane W. Layton & Paulette Vander Schueren, WTO Rejects US 
Department of Commerce’s Antidumping Methodology for Non-Market 
Economies, MAYER BROWN (Nov. 25, 2014), 
https://www.mayerbrown.com/en/perspectives-events/publications/2014 
/11/wto-rejects-us-department-of-commerces-antidumping [https://perma 
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case, is a WTO violation.125  In the U.S. view, “The purpose of 
the dispute settlement system is not to produce reports or to 
‘make law,’ but rather to help Members resolve trade disputes 
among them.”126  
•“[T]he Appellate Body’s review of the meaning of a Member’s 
domestic law that is being challenged,”127  and 
•The Appellate Body’s position that “its reports effectively 
serve as precedent and that panels are to follow prior Appellate 
Body reports absent ‘cogent reasons.’”128  
These concerns clearly arise from a multiplicity of DSM rulings 
against U.S. practices in trade remedy (antidumping, countervailing 
duty, and safeguard) cases.  In the U.S. view, “the WTO is 
undermining our country’s ability to act in its national interest.”129 
But “reforming” the DSM to “correct” these aspects of its current 
practice would be truly radical.  It would in many ways take the 
system back to the very limited role it played in the GATT era and 
negate the very changes that the U.S. brought about in the formation 
of the World Trade Organization.  
In seeking such “reform” of the DSM, the United States is using 
leverage in ways similar to the practices discussed earlier in this 
paper. 
First, as noted earlier, President Trump has threatened to 
withdraw the U.S. from the WTO if U.S. demands are not met.130  
One must wonder, however, whether this withdrawal threat has much 
credibility.  U.S. departure from the WTO would have massively 
severe adverse consequences for our country, such as:  
•Countries could raise tariffs on U.S. goods at will; 
•U.S. trade remedy duties, now permitted under the 
Antidumping, ASCM, and Safeguard Agreements, could be met 
with retaliatory tariffs; 
•DSM challenges of foreign countries’ access barriers and other 
unfair practices, of which the U.S. has won the vast majority 
that it has brought, would no longer be available; and  
 
125. See id. at 172-9 (discussing “as such” opinions). 
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128. Id. at 28. 
129. Id. 
130. Micklethwait et al., supra note 14. 
Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 51 (2019) 
Leverage is Everything 
70 
•The U.S. could no longer participate in WTO multilateral or 
plurilateral negotiations to establish the rules of world trade. 
Moreover, for all of these reasons, it seems inconceivable that the 
U.S. Congress would permit a U.S. withdrawal from the WTO. 
But the U.S. has found another, much more effective, leverage 
procedure.  Throughout the Trump Administration, the U.S. has 
exercised its right to block the appointment of new Appellate Body 
members to fill seats vacated by retirement, departure, or expiration 
of term.131 We have now reached the point where there are only three 
Appellate Body members remaining.132  Since each appeal to the 
Appellate Body must be heard by three members,133 the departure of 
one more member—which will happen in December of 2019—and the 
U.S.’s refusal to allow a replacement will bring the Dispute 
Settlement Mechanism to a halt. 
The WTO Membership is acutely aware of the impending crisis 
created by this U.S. leverage device.134 Groups of Members have 
organized to explore ways to promote a compromise.135  In a little-
recognized part of the U.S.-EU modus vivendi reached this summer to 
defer the U.S. threat of auto Section 232 tariffs, the EU agreed to 
work with the U.S. to resolve U.S. concerns about the WTO.136 
It seems to this writer—and I say this with great concern—that 
the U.S. leverage strategy has a substantial likelihood of success in 
effecting changes in the DSM.  The WTO Membership must find a 
way to appease the United States before the next Appellate Body 
vacancy occurs. While an agreement to adopt ways to address China’s 
“state capitalism” might well be enough to satisfy the Trump 
Administration, it seems clear to me that neither the China issue nor 
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the developed/developing Member divide have any chance whatsoever 
of garnering sufficient support among the WTO Membership.  At this 
time, therefore, that leaves DSM “reform” as the only way out.  
Which, of course, would be a great pity. 
V. NAFTA 
It is interesting to read the indictment of NAFTA set forth in the 
President’s 2018 Trade Policy Agenda.  Almost all of the criticisms 
are directed at the Mexican portion of the trilateral agreement.137  By 
far, the major concern is that NAFTA provided incentives for 
“thousands of American companies” to shift production to Mexico, 
where they would “pay far lower wages to workers.”138 Canada gets a 
single sentence: “NAFTA failed to address longstanding and unfair 
Canadian trade practices across several industries.”139 
Accordingly, the primary U.S. negotiating goal was to “improve 
the U.S. trade balance and reduce the trade deficit with the NAFTA 
countries.”140 This would be done by tightening rules of origin, 
especially for autos and auto parts, increasing the requirements both 
for regional content and for U.S. content, and by avoiding provisions 
that encourage outsourcing.141 
As soon as the talks commenced, however, USTR put on the table 
a series of additional demands that provoked outrage in both Mexico 
and Canada, including: 
•A “sunset” provision, under which NAFTA would have to be 
renewed every five years;142 
•Termination of the Chapter 19 provision that permitted U.S. 
import relief decisions to be appealed to a trilateral body 
instead of to domestic courts (a provision held dear by 
Canada);143 
 
137. 2018 TRADE POLICY AGENDA, supra note 116, at 7-9. 
138. Id. at 7. 
139. Id. at 8. 
140. Id. at 9. 
141. Id. 
142. David Lawder, U.S. Hikes Tensions in NAFTA Talks with Call for ‘Sunset 
Clause’, REUTERS (Oct. 12, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-
trade-nafta/u-s-hikes-tensions-in-nafta-talks-with-call-for-sunset-clause-
idUSKBN1CH2EO [https://perma.cc/VYW8-U6UP]. 
143. Riyaz Dattu et al., International Trade Brief: Trump Administration Takes 
Aim at Chapter 19 of NAFTA, U.S. Wish List for NAFTA Renegotiations 
and More, OSLER (Apr. 6, 2017) https://www.osler.com/en/resources/cross-
border/2017/international-trade-brief-trump-administration-ta 
[https://perma.cc/K7FU-99RF]. 
Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 51 (2019) 
Leverage is Everything 
72 
•A requirement that automobiles and parts entering the United 
States would not qualify for duty-free entry unless a certain 
percentage of their content be produced by workers paid at least 
$16 per hour (compared with the average daily wage in Mexico’s 
auto plants of $25);144 
•Elimination or major modification of Canada’s “supply 
management” regime for dairy and poultry;145 and 
•Reform of certain Canadian intellectual property rules and of 
procedural rules in certain provinces hampering sales of U.S. 
wines.146 
The negotiations were going nowhere by early 2018.147  The U.S. 
Section 232 tariffs on steel and aluminum were met with retaliatory 
tariffs,148 WTO challenges,149 and declarations that  the EU would not 
“negotiate with a gun to our heads.”150 
Accordingly, the U.S. ratcheted up the leverage by announcing a 
Section 232 proceeding on automobiles and auto parts, despite 
opposition by U.S. auto and auto parts makers,151 whose operations 
are inextricably intertwined with their Mexican and Canadian 
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operations.152  Shortly thereafter, President Trump announced that 
the United States would negotiate separately with Mexico and, if 
Canada did not join later a deal done with Mexico, the Canada part 
of NAFTA could be abandoned.153  Mexico agreed, both because of 
the severe threat of auto tariffs and because of a turn taken by its 
domestic politics.154 
The leftist candidate, Lopez Obrador, won the election and 
became President at the end of 2018.155  He wanted the NAFTA issue 
to be resolved before he assumed power.156  And the outgoing 
President, Peña Nieto, wanted the new deal done in time for him to 
sign it.157 
So, as to Mexico, the combination of the leverage of threatened 
tariffs and the domestic Mexican politics got a deal done. A month 
later, Canada also signed what is now re-named the United States-
Mexico-Canada Agreement, or USMCA.158 One must conclude that 
the leverage of threatened Section 232 tariffs on autos and auto parts 
succeeded. 
There remain, however, questions as to whether Canada and 
Mexico will ratify USMCA.  Both countries believe they were 
 
152. Rob Stumpf, Trump’s New Trade Deal Could Affect One in Three 
Imported Vehicles From Mexico: Report, Tʜᴇ Dʀɪᴠᴇ (Aug. 29, 2018), 
http://www.thedrive.com/news/23212/trumps-new-trade-deal-with-mexico-
would-affect-one-in-three-vehicles-says-reports [https://perma.cc/34S3-
K7RJ]; Jerry Edgerton, If Trump Slaps Auto Tariffs on Canada, Here’s 
What You’ll Pay, CBS (Sept. 5, 2018), https://www.cbsnews.com 
/news/trump-auto-tariffs-canada-what-it-will-cost-you/ 
[https://perma.cc/X5ZX-UJ9F]. 
153. Joyce McGregor, Trump Announces U.S.-Mexico Trade Deal to Replace 
NAFTA, and Says ‘We Will See’ If Canada Can Join, CBC NEWS (Aug. 
27, 2018 10:24 AM), https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/nafta-us-mexico-
progress-monday-1.4800182 [https://perma.cc/EF3L-36YP]. 
154. Eric Kulisch, Trump Vows to Scrap NAFTA, Threatens Canada After 
Reaching Deal with Mexico, AUTOMOTIVE NEWS (Aug. 27, 2018), 
https://www.autonews.com/article/20180827/OEM01/180829783/trump-
vows-to-scrap-nafta-threatens-canada-after-reaching-deal-with-mexico. 
155. Azam Ahmed, Lopez Obrador, an Atypical Leftist, Wins Mexico Presidency 
in Landslide, N.Y. TIMES (July 1, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com 
/2018/07/01/world/americas/mexico-election-andres-manuel-lopez-
obrador.html [https://perma.cc/V5GL-K2GS]. 
156. Elisabeth Malkin, Mexico’s New Leader, Once a Nafta Foe, Welcomes New 
Deal, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 1, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2018/10/01/world/americas/nafta-mexico.html [https://perma.cc/C5B5-
ZD7W]. 
157. Id. 
158. Office of the U.S. Trade Rep., United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement 
Text, at https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/united-
states-mexico-canada-agreement/agreement-between [hereinafter USCMA].  
Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 51 (2019) 
Leverage is Everything 
74 
promised that, if they signed the new USMCA, they would be given 
exemptions from the Section 232 tariffs on steel and 
aluminum.159 However, the United States has taken the position that 
such exemptions will be granted only if Mexico and Canada agree to 
quantitative limits on their steel and aluminum exports.160 Both 
Canada and Mexico have threatened not to ratify unless tariff 
exemptions are granted without quantitative limitations.161 As of this 
writing, in April 2019, it is not clear how this issue will be resolved.  
Very recently, President Trump has raised a new issue as to the 
Section 232 tariffs on autos and auto parts.  Both Canada and Mexico 
are to be effectively exempted from any auto tariffs that are imposed 
by a USMCA provision that will allow each country to make tariff-
free shipments of quantities that exceed their current levels of exports 
to the United States.162  However, USMCA is not yet in force and 
President Trump has recently threatened to place Section 232 tariffs 
on Mexican autos if Mexico does not adopt sufficient measures to stop 
the flow of Central American refugees to the United States and 
sufficient measures to stop the flow of dangerous drugs into the 
United States.163  
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What does this tell us?  It provides still further confirmation that, 
for the Trump Administration, threats of tariffs and other unilateral 
trade measures are seen as leverage instruments, including leverage 
with respect to objectives unrelated to trade. 
VI.  Some Concluding Thoughts 
The foregoing narratives underscore the importance of considering 
trade negotiations and unilateral import restrictions together in order 
to understand both the nature of this Administration’s goals and the 
dynamics of leverage in the negotiating process. 
I would also observe that, as of April 2019, we have not yet seen 
a final endgame that would show how this Administration will handle 
a situation in which it actually has to exercise the leverage it has 
created.  For now, the U.S. has not actually withdrawn from an 
existing trade agreement. TPP and TTIP were not agreements to 
which the U.S. had become a party, nor were they ones as to which 
the Trump Administration sought additional concessions, so there was 
no use of leverage to induce some agreement by other parties. Nor 
have we seen what the Administration would do if the other party 
were to refuse to agree to the U.S. demands, raising the question 
whether they would actually exercise the leverage they had created.  
Note in this regard that President Trump, upon reaching agreement 
with Mexico, initially gave Canada a one-week deadline to reach an 
agreement.164  But when that did not happen, he extended that 
deadline until the end of September.165  If Canada had not reached an 
agreement by then, would the President have “pulled the trigger” and 
imposed auto tariffs (Indeed, could he have done so, since the 
Commerce Department had not completed its process)? Would he 
have given the required 6-month notice of termination of NAFTA166 
as to Canada? Could he have terminated as to one country and not 
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the other? Or would he have had to terminate NAFTA entirely and 
re-cast the Mexico deal as a separate FTA? Finally, what will be the 
result of his new threat to impose Section 232 auto tariffs on Mexico 
if he is not satisfied with Mexico’s refugee and drug policies? 
The China Section 301 and WTO “reform” situations also raise 
complex, but immensely important questions.  If no agreement is 
reached with China, will the Administration keep increasing the 
amount of Chinese imports on which tariffs are imposed? And what is 
the ultimate end game if, as I believe likely, China proves unwilling to 
negotiate some of the structural reforms demanded by the United 
States? 
The WTO situation is even more complex, although the 
timeframe is more extended.  The ultimate question is whether the 
United States is truly willing to bring the WTO dispute settlement 
system to a halt just to avoid meaningful WTO review of U.S. 
antidumping and countervailing duty decisions? Would it insist on 
something more, like better rules disciplining Chinese practices?  
Could such better rules be obtained? Would the WTO Membership 
simply refuse to accede to U.S. demands on any of these issues? Might 
the WTO find a way to appoint new Appellate Body members over 
U.S. objections? These are indeed big questions, and one lesson I draw 
is that, before establishing something that gives your country 
leverage, it is important to game plan for whether and how you might 
have to exercise that leverage. I do not see evidence that the Trump 
Administration has done that. 
 
